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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REGULATING WHAT’S NOT REAL: FEDERAL REGULATION IN
THE AFTERMATH OF ASHCROFT v. FREE SPEECH COALITION

No calamity so touches the common heart of humanity as does the straying of a
little child.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Pornographic images created using real children raise serious concerns
about the sexual exploitation of children. Tragically, pedophiles and child
molesters prey on young children by using them to create images that “feed
their sexual obsessions, . . . stimulate their sex drive and validate their desire to
actually assault children.”2 Philip Jenkins, author of Beyond Tolerance,
recounts the following painful and disturbing story of a young female victim:
[A] British girl . . . , tragically, may be one of the best-known sex stars on the
Web. In the late 1980s, as a little girl of seven or eight, [she] became the
subject of a photo series that depicted her not only in all the familiar nude
poses of hard-core pornography but also showed her in numerous sex acts with
[a young boy] of about the same age. Both are shown having sex with an adult
man, presumably [the young girl’s] father. . . . [These images] are cherished by
thousands of collectors worldwide. They seem to be the standard starter kit for
child porn novices.3

It should be no surprise that a child’s participation in the production of
such images severely impacts that child’s psychological well-being.4 There is
ample evidence to suggest that children used in the production of such images
struggle to develop healthy relationships as adults, endure sexual dysfunction,
have a tendency to become sexual abusers themselves, and engage in drug and
alcohol abuse, prostitution, or other self-destructive behavior later in life.5 The
premature introduction of sexuality to a child might result in a lasting
unhealthy emotional reaction to normal sexual experiences.6 In addition, “the
1. William Sydney Porter.
2. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, advertisement, In the Case of Child
Pornography, the More Underdeveloped the Better the Picture (2003), available at
www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/Ad_Underdeveloped_8.5x11.pdf.
3. PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 2
(2001).
4. S. REP. NO. 95-438, pt. IV(C), at 9 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 46.
5. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982).
6. ANN WOLBERT BURGESS, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEX RINGS 111 (1984) (“[T]he
child might perform physiologically but not respond emotionally. In such a case the sexual
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child may be programmed to use sex to acquire recognition, attention, and
validation . . . [and] the child may learn that sex is something basically
improper that needs to be cloaked in secrecy.”7 Further, the impact of the
abuse is not limited to the actual experience; a child victim who bravely
discloses the experience to family or authorities finds him or herself reliving
the stress and anxiety of the experience before and during disclosure.8
To add further pain to the inevitable psychological injury resulting from a
child victim’s participation in the creation of child pornography, these victims
are left with “a permanent record of [their] participation and the harm to the
child is exacerbated by [the materials’] circulation.”9
Before society’s relatively recent technology boom and the resulting
widespread use of the Internet, child pornographers were limited to using real
children to create their material. Today, unfortunately, technological advances
have given child pornographers a new set of tools for the development of
pornographic images that depict children in sexually explicit ways. Some say
that computers have “emancipated pedophiles from having to exploit and
abuse real children.”10 Further, the computer and the Internet have become the
nearly-exclusive means by which child pornography is viewed and exchanged
by other child pornographers and child molesters.11 As one commentator
noted:
[C]hild porn is extremely difficult to obtain through non-electronic means and
has been so for twenty years . . . . It is a substantial presence, and much of the
material [on the Internet] is worse than most of us can imagine, in terms of the
types of activity depicted and the ages of the children portrayed.12

One unfortunate result of society’s technology boom and widespread use
of the Internet is the introduction of virtual child pornography to the child
pornographer’s production capabilities. Virtual child pornography involves
methods by which computer-savvy child pornographers use technology to
create computer-generated images of children that look real and, even more
frighteningly, to disguise images of real children so that they appear computer-

activity either becomes the only mode of emotional expression or becomes separated and isolated
from emotion.”).
7. Id.
8. See generally id. at 112-20.
9. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
10. Adam J. Wasserman, Virtual Child.Porn.Com: Defending the Constitutionality of the
Criminalization of Computer-Generated Child Pornography by the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996—A Reply to Professor Burke and Other Critics, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
245, 246 (1998).
11. See JENKINS, supra note 3, at 9.
12. Id.
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generated.13 For example, child pornographers and pedophiles can use 3-D
modeling programs to create images of children that are indistinguishable from
real children.14 In addition, innocent pictures of actual children can be altered
by inexpensive graphics programs to create a sexually explicit image of the
same child.15
These technological advances and the resulting introduction of virtual child
pornography have muddled the already murky landscape of child pornography
regulation and have challenged courts and Congress to more precisely define
what images fall outside the boundaries of protected speech under the First
Amendment. On April 16, 2002, the Supreme Court rejected Congress’s first
attempt to regulate virtual child pornography in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition.16 In this case, the Court faced a challenge to sections of the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) and held that it was “overbroad
and unconstitutional,”17 stressing that the CPPA prohibited speech that might
have “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”18 The Court
emphasized that the “CPPA prohibit[ed] speech that records no crime and
creates no victims by its production.”19 Further, the Court held that otherwiseprotected speech cannot be suppressed simply because it might be used for
criminal acts in the future.20
The Free Speech Coalition decision has been interpreted as marking the
Court’s rejection of a complete ban on virtual child pornography.21 Further,
the decision appears to protect the production of non-obscene, computer-

13. H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. § 2(5) (2002). This practice has contributed to allegedly
impossible prosecutorial proof hurdles. See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
14. See H.R. 4623 § 2(5).
15. See id.
16. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
17. Id. at 258.
18. Id. at 246 (“The CPPA prohibits speech despite its serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.”).
19. Id. at 250.
20. Id.; see also Freedom of Speech and Expression, 116 HARV. L. REV. 262, 266 (2002).
21. Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002 and the Sex Tourism
Prohibition Improvement Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 4623 and H.R. 4477 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 4 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4623] (statement of Daniel P. Collins,
Associate Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice) (“[T]he Court concluded . . . that New York v. Ferber, the leading Supreme Court case
that allows the criminalization of child pornography, could not be extended to support a complete
ban on virtual child pornography . . . .”); see also Freedom of Speech and Expression, supra note
20, at 269 (“The Court’s construction of the CPPA is yet another indication of its increasing
distrust of categorical, value-based exclusions from First Amendment protection.”).
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generated images of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct so long as
no actual child was used in the production of the image.22
This result is understandably unsettling to those who cannot fathom a
scenario in which an image (virtual or not) of a child engaging in sexually
explicit conduct has social, literary, artistic, or scientific value.23 On the other
hand, those who support the Free Speech Coalition decision applaud the Court
for rejecting what was perceived to be an unconstitutional, overly broad
regulation of speech.24 While supporters of the decision concede that certain
categories of expression, including child pornography, are beyond the
protection of the First Amendment because of their “slight social value,”25 they
argue that, if Congress must regulate virtual child pornography, it must do so
in a manner that does not inadvertently silence speech that would otherwise be
protected by the First Amendment.26
Congress has struggled to draft legislation that both captures the truly
objectionable virtual child pornography and stays within the boundaries of the
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. For example, in Free Speech
Coalition, the Court held that one of the major flaws in the CPPA was
Congress’s failure to define precisely what harm results from virtual child
pornography when no actual child is used to create the sexually explicit
image.27 The Government argued that virtual child pornography fuels the

22. Enhancing Child Protection Laws After the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision,
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 3 (2002) [hereinafter
Enhancing Child Protection Laws] (statement of Va. Robert C. Scott, Member, House Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security).
23. See Rikki Solowey, Comment, A Question of Equivalence: Expanding the Definition of
Child Pornography to Encompass “Virtual” Computer-Generated Images, 4 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 161, 200 (2002) (“Failing to prohibit virtual pornographic images of children
would be sending the wrong message to society . . . . Permitting such images to be legally
available gives molesters the false idea that this can be done to children.”).
24. See Aimee G. Hamoy, Comment, The Constitutionality of Virtual Child Pornography:
Why Reality and Fantasy Are Still Different Under the First Amendment, 12 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 471, 517 (2002) (concluding that “prohibiting Congress from criminalizing virtual fantasies
and the imaginations of sophisticated computer users remains consistent with both the Court’s
jurisprudence in the area of child pornography and the First Amendment”).
25. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (holding that “[t]here
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”); see generally Freedom of
Speech and Expression, supra note 20, at 268 (explaining that these other categories include
obscenity, profanity, libel, fighting words, and commercial speech).
26. As the Free Speech Coalition argued against the CPPA, “the government’s interest in
protecting children does not justify reducing the entire adult population to reading and viewing
only what is fit for children.” Respondent’s Brief at 15, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. 234 (2002) (No. 00-795).
27. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250.
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proliferation of the child pornography market and emphasized the negative
secondary effects that virtual child pornography might have on subsequent
viewers of the material.28 This argument was flatly rejected by the majority in
Free Speech Coalition, which held that “[v]irtual child pornography is not
‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children . . . . [T]he causal link
[between virtual child pornography images and actual instances of child abuse]
is contingent and indirect.”29 Without such a causal link between speech and
its resulting harm, the Court said, the Government may not suppress speech
simply because it may “encourage” pedophiles and molesters to abuse
children.30
In the wake of the Free Speech Coalition decision, both the House and
Senate have made new attempts to draft legislation that targets the evils
associated with virtual child pornography.31 Determined to ensure the
effective enforcement of established child pornography laws, Congress has
enacted legislation in response to—and, as this Note will consider, potentially
consistent with—the Free Speech Coalition decision. On April 30, 2003,
President George W. Bush signed into law the Prosecutorial Remedies and
Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003
(PROTECT Act 2003).32 Whatever the fate might be for the PROTECT Act
2003, Congress has made notable progress in crafting legislation that respects
the free speech guarantees embodied in the First Amendment, while targeting
the specific evils associated with virtual child pornography.
As background to the PROTECT Act 2003, this Note will provide a brief
survey of the Supreme Court’s obscenity and child pornography jurisprudence,
including Miller v. California and New York v. Ferber and will briefly outline
the unchallenged federal criminalization of child pornography that is created
by using real children.

28. Petitioner’s Brief at 14, Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S 234 (No. 00-795). See
Solowey, supra note 23, at 181 (explaining that child pornography, both real and virtual, is often
used by pedophiles as a means to instruct their child victims on how to engage in sexual behavior,
as a way to break children down and trick them into feeling more comfortable about engaging in
the sexual behavior, and also as a pseudo-currency with which to exchange child pornography
with fellow pedophiles, leading to the intolerable result of a thriving child pornography market).
The secondary effects and market proliferation theories were relied upon greatly by the
Government in Free Speech Coalition to support upholding the CPPA. See Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. at 251-54.
29. Id. at 250.
30. Id. at 253-54.
31. See H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 2520, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 1161, 108th
Cong. (2003); S. 151, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted). See generally Enhancing Child Protection
Laws, supra note 22, at 3 (statement of Tx. Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security) (“The elimination of child pornography in all forms and the
protection of children from sexual exploitation should be one of Congress’s highest priorities.”).
32. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650.
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Next, this Note will trace Congress’s past attempts to regulate child
pornography, including the CPPA, and will explore the reasons behind the
Court’s rejection of the CPPA’s virtual child pornography provisions in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.
Finally, this Note will highlight key provisions of the PROTECT Act 2003
and will analyze how the Act conforms to or deviates from the guidelines set
forth in the Free Speech Coalition decision with respect to the following
categories: (1) the definition of virtual child pornography; (2) the
criminalization of pandering and solicitation of virtual child pornography, and
(3) the affirmative defense.
II. OBSCENITY AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY—LEADING CASES
A.

Miller v. California

In Miller v. California, the Court tightened up the then unworkably-loose
definition of obscenity.33 In Miller, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
longstanding view that obscene material is not protected by the First
Amendment.34 Precisely defining obscenity, however, proved to be more
difficult for the Court. In this landmark decision, the Court provided the
following three-prong test for determining whether something is obscene:
(a) [W]hether “the average person, applying contemporary community
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable . . . law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.35

33. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973) (5-4 decision) (noting that “no majority of
the Court has at any given time been able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes
obscene, pornographic material”). Before Miller, Justice Burger noted, the Court had assumed
“the role of an unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, subjectively judging each
piece of material brought before us.” Id. at 22 n.3.
34. Id. at 23; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (holding
that “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene . . . .”). In Miller, the appellant was convicted of violating a California
statute that prohibited “knowingly distributing obscene matter.” Miller, 413 U.S. at 16. The
appellant, in a mass-mailing, advertised books containing sexually explicit material. The
advertisements contained “very explicit[]” depictions of men and women engaging in sexual
activity. Id. at 17-18.
35. Id. at 24 (citation omitted) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
This decision flatly rejected the Court’s earlier obscenity test articulated in A Book Named ‘John
Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure’ v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The
standard in Memoirs required the Court to find “that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it
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Whether something appeals to the “prurient interest” or is “patently offensive”
is a question of fact and must be determined based on the standards of the
particular community.36 The Court rejected the implementation of national
standards, noting that such standards would ultimately prove “hypothetical and
unascertainable.”37 The majority in Miller emphasized that “[t]he First
Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a
majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent.”38
B.

New York v. Ferber

Nine years after the Court decided Miller, the Court decided New York v.
Ferber, the leading case on the regulation of child pornography involving the
use of real children in its production.39 At issue in Ferber was the
constitutionality of a New York statute that prohibited the promotion and
distribution of material that depicted a child younger than sixteen engaging in a
sexual performance.40 Holding that “[s]tates are entitled to greater leeway in
the regulation of pornographic depictions of children,”41 the Court found that:
(1) there is a compelling governmental interest in “‘safeguarding the physical
and psychological well-being of a minor;’”42 (2) “[t]he distribution of
photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically
related to the sexual abuse of children . . . . [because] the materials produced

affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.” Id. at 418.
36. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30 (“These are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply
too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated
for all 50 States in a single formulation . . . .”).
37. Id. at 31.
38. Id. at 34.
39. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). In Free Speech Coalition, there was
substantial debate regarding the reach of Ferber. The Government read the case as extending
beyond the protection of real children and suggested that the same considerations that persuaded
the Court in Ferber to limit First Amendment protection of child pornography involving real
children should apply to the “virtual” material covered by the CPPA. Petitioner’s Brief at 15,
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (No. 00-795). In fact, the Government plainly
stated in its Supreme Court brief that “Ferber did not hold that the government’s sole compelling
interest is in regulating depictions involving real children.” Id. Alternatively, others read the
Ferber holding as limited to protecting only real children who suffer harm because of their
participation in the production of child pornography. For example, the Free Speech Coalition
argued that “Congress can ban child pornography only to the extent that the proscribed material
portrays sexually explicit conduct by actual children.” Respondent’s Brief at 2, Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (No. 00-795).
40. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 750-51.
41. Id. at 756.
42. Id. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)).
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are a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child
is exacerbated by their circulation,”43 (3) “advertising and selling of child
pornography provide an economic motive for . . . the production of such
materials,”44 and (4) “[t]he value of permitting live performances and
photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”45
The Ferber Court explicitly rejected the respondent’s argument that the
Miller obscenity standard should apply to child pornography.46 The Court
maintained that the Miller standard did not adequately support the State’s
“more compelling” interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation.47
In reviewing pornography that involves the use of an actual child, a court
should not consider the work as a whole and need not determine that the
material appeals to the prurient interest or that the sexual conduct portrayed is
patently offensive.48 Note, however, that the “serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value” prong of Miller49 remains intact for the purposes
of child pornography after Ferber.50
In sum, Ferber makes clear that child pornography involving the use of
real children “bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children
engaged in its production [and therefore,] . . . it is permissible to consider these
materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.”51 Therefore,
under Ferber, if a child was involved in the production of a sexually explicit
image, that image receives no First Amendment protection even if the image
would not be deemed obscene under the Miller three-prong test.52
The Ferber Court, however, did provide the following guidance to
legislators of future child pornography statutes: “Here the nature of the harm to
be combated requires that the . . . offense be limited to works that visually
depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age.”53 Further, the Court
emphasized that “depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which

43. Id. at 759 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 761.
45. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
46. Id. at 761. The Court plainly stated, “We therefore cannot conclude that the Miller
standard is a satisfactory solution to the child pornography problem.” Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 764-65.
49. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
50. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65; id. at 774 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (writing separately “to
stress that the Court does not hold that New York must except ‘material with serious literary,
scientific, or educational value,’ from its statute.” (citation omitted) (quoting majority opinion at
766)).
51. Id. at 764.
52. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
53. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (second emphasis added).
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do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction
of live performances, retains First Amendment protection.”54
C. Post-Ferber Regulation of “Real” Child Pornography
After Ferber, there is virtually no debate regarding the constitutionality of
legislation that targets the use of real children engaged in sexually explicit
conduct in the production of pornographic materials.55
As a result, neither the Free Speech Coalition nor the other parties who
challenged the constitutionality of the CPPA challenged the categories of
speech prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) and (C).56 Section 2256(8)(A)
prohibits any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct where “the
production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.”57 In addition, § 2256(8)(C) prohibits “visual
depiction[s] [that] ha[ve] been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an
identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”58 This provision
prohibits the computerized “morphing” of innocent images of actual children
into sexually explicit depictions of the same children.59
As previously noted, while the Ferber holding is clear regarding child
pornography created using real children, there was significant debate in Free
Speech Coalition about the Ferber holding as it applied to sexually explicit
images that appear to depict children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.60
III. PAST FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY REGULATION
Primarily concerned with the growth of multimillion-dollar child
pornography and prostitution industries nationwide, Congress first addressed
the issue of child pornography with the passage of the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.61 The Act’s Senate Report noted that
at the time, current law addressed only the sale, distribution, and importation of

54. Id. at 765.
55. United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 651 (11th Cir. 1999) (“To the extent it defines
‘child pornography’ as images of actual minors, the CPPA passes constitutional muster with room
to spare.”).
56. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241-42 (2002).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
58. Id. § 2256(8)(C) (emphasis added). Section 2256(1) defines a minor as any person
younger than eighteen.
59. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 242 (“Although morphed images may fall within the
definition of virtual child pornography, they implicate the interests of real children and are in that
sense closer to the images in Ferber.”); see also Respondent’s Brief at 9, Free Speech Coalition,
535 U.S. 234 (No. 00-795).
60. See supra note 39.
61. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253);
see S. REP. NO. 95-438, pt. II, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 40-41.
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obscene materials and emphasized the importance of creating federal laws to
deal directly with the abuse of children that results from their involvement in
the production of pornographic materials.62 As a result, the Act prohibited the
use of children younger than sixteen years old in the production of
pornographic materials and made it a crime to knowingly distribute such
images for commercial purposes.63
Following the Ferber decision, Congress next responded by enacting the
Child Protection Act of 1984,64 which eliminated the commercial purposes
requirement of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of
1977, raised the age of a minor from sixteen to eighteen, and removed the
requirement that the material be obscene within the meaning set forth in
Miller.65 The impetus for the passage of this Act was Congress’s concern that
child pornographers who distributed materials without any commercial motive
were still ultimately causing harm to the children they used in the production
of the pornographic material and were escaping liability under the statute by
claiming that they had no commercial motivation. Congress noted that “the
harm to the child exists whether or not those who initiate or carry out the
schemes are motivated by profit.”66
In 1986, Congress passed the Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of
1986,67 which made illegal any advertisement created by anyone who sought
or offered to receive, exchange, produce, display, distribute, or reproduce any
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.68 The Act
also prohibited those seeking to buy child pornography or participate in the
production of child pornography from publishing any notice or advertisement
of their illegal intentions.69
In the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988,70
Congress further refined its laws regulating child pornography by requiring
“[w]hoever produces any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, or other
62. S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 5, 15 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 43, 53.
63. Id. at 15.
64. Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254).
65. H.R. REP. NO. 98-536, at 7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 493-94.
66. H.R. REP. NO. 98-536, at 2-3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 493-94. Note
Congress’s focus on the harm to the actual child. The House Report stated that the Act “would
limit coverage under the Act to visual depiction of children engaged in explicit sex acts, rather
than . . . written depictions . . . [because there is] an obscenity requirement in the case of written
depictions.” Id. at 5. This demonstrates Congress’s focus on preventing the harm to the child
who engages in the production of the material rather than on outside effects of the production and
distribution of child pornography that did not involve the use of a child in its production.
67. Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3510 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c)).
68. H.R. REP. NO. 99-910, at 5-6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5952, 5955.
69. Id. at 6.
70. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7511, 102 Stat. 4485 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2251(c), 2252(a), 2256, 2257).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

REGULATING WHAT’S NOT REAL

1073

matter which . . . contains one or more visual depictions . . . of actual sexually
explicit conduct . . . shipped in interstate or foreign commerce . . . [to] create
and maintain individually identifiable records pertaining to every performer
portrayed in such a visual depiction.”71 The Act also made illegal the use of a
computer to transport, distribute, or receive child pornography.72
The Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990
prohibited the knowing sale of images of children engaged in sexually explicit
conduct and prohibited the possession of such images with the intent to sell
them.73 The Act also prohibited the knowing possession of three or more
depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.74 This provision
was Congress’s reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Osborne v. Ohio,75
where the Court found that the child pornography market was largely
underground and noted that legislation aimed only at the production and
distribution of child pornography did little to curb the developing underground
market for child pornography.76 Additionally, the Court found that “evidence
suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into
sexual activity.”77 The Court encouraged the passage of laws that would fuel
the destruction of materials created using actual children.78
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 was one of Congress’s
earliest forays into the regulation of virtual child pornography.79 Concerned
with the growing use of then-advanced computer and photographic
technologies to produce real and virtual child pornography, Congress passed
the CPPA to criminalize the production, distribution, possession, sale, or

71. Id. § 7513, 102 Stat. at 4487.
72. Id. § 7511, 102 Stat. at 4485; see also Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual
Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 439, 451 (1997)
(explaining that Congress criminalized the use of a computer “to transport, distribute, or receive
child pornography” to combat the growing use of computer networks in the child pornography
market).
73. Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101647, § 323, 104 Stat. 4816, 4818 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252).
74. Id.
75. See Burke, supra note 72, at 451.
76. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990).
77. Id. at 111.
78. Id. (“[E]ncouraging the destruction of these materials is . . . desirable because evidence
suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.”).
79. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-26; see Wade T. Anderson, Criminalizing “Virtual” Child Pornography Under the Child
Pornography Prevention Act: Is it Really What it “Appears to Be?,” 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 393,
397 (2001) (explaining that after the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988,
the CPPA was Congress’s “next significant step in addressing the power of computers to supply
the child-porn market”).
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viewing of both real and virtual child pornography.80 Specifically, the
Congressional findings accompanying the CPPA noted that new technologies
“make it possible to produce by electronic, mechanical, or other means, visual
depictions of what appear to be children engaging in sexually explicit conduct
that are virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from
unretouched photographic images of actual children engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.”81 Further, the Senate’s findings emphasized the danger of
child pornographers’ computer alteration of sexually explicit images so that it
becomes impossible to detect if the images were created using actual
children.82
The Congressional findings also focused on the negative secondary effects
of both real and virtual child pornography and maintained that harm occurs to a
child viewing a sexually explicit image whether or not the child depicted in the
image is real or “virtually indistinguishable” from a real child.83 In sum, this
component of the CPPA’s rationale is based primarily on the idea that child
abusers who use a computer-generated image of a child engaging in sexual
conduct to seduce a real child into engaging in sexual conduct should not go
unpunished.84 In this context, any distinction between images that portray
actual children and images of computer-generated children involves a “mere
technicality”85 as the damaging influence on the real child is the same no
matter how the image was created.
To target these evils, Congress expanded the definition of child
pornography to include two new categories of prohibited speech in 18 U.S.C. §
2256. First, § 2256(8)(B) prohibited visual depictions of sexually explicit
conduct where “such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct.”86 Second, § 2256(8)(D) prohibited anyone from
advertising, promoting, presenting, describing, or distributing visual depictions

80. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 § 121(1)(13). The CPPA “addresses the
problem of ‘high-tech kiddie porn’ by creating a comprehensive statutory definition of the term
‘child pornography’ to include material produced using children engaging in sexually explicit
conduct [and] computer-generated depictions which are, or appear to be, of minors engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.” S. REP. NO. 104-358, pt. I, at 7 (1996).
81. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 § 121(1)(5).
82. Id. § 121(1)(6).
83. Id. § 121(1)(9); see also S. REP. NO. 104-358, pt. III, at 8 (1996) (“The effect of such
child pornography . . . on a child shown such material as a means of seducing the child into
sexual activity, is the same whether the material is photographic or computer-generated
depictions of child sexual activity.”).
84. S. REP. NO. 104-358, pt. I, at 7 (1996) (“[T]he development of computer technology
capable of producing child pornographic depictions virtually indistinguishable from photographic
depictions of actual children threatens the Federal Government’s ability to protect children from
sexual exploitation . . . .”).
85. Solowey, supra note 23, at 178.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000).
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of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct in a manner that “conveys the
impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”87
The effect of Congress’s expansion of the definition of child pornography
in the CPPA was to create new categories of forbidden speech under the
Court’s broad prohibition of child pornography articulated in Ferber.88 It was
these two provisions that were specifically challenged in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition.89
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION
DECISION
A.

The Circuit Split

Before the Supreme Court heard Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, five
circuits passed on the issue of the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2256(B) and
(D). Of the five circuits, four upheld the provisions as constitutional and one
did not.
One of the first circuit cases was United States v. Hilton, where the First
Circuit reversed the District Court for the District of Maine and held the CPPA
to be constitutional.90 At issue in Hilton was the constitutionality of §
2256(8)(B)’s prohibition of sexually explicit images that “appear to be a
minor” engaging in sexually explicit conduct.91 Hilton was indicted by a grand
jury for the criminal possession of computer disks that contained three or more
images of child pornography in violation of § 2252A(5)(b).92 In Hilton, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals boiled down the issue of the provision’s
constitutionality into four main “lessons.”93 First, the court held that material
that appears to depict a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct must be
87. Id. § 2256(8)(D), repealed by PROTECT Act 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502(a)(3), 117
Stat. 650, 678.
88. John P. Feldmeier, Close Enough for Government Work: An Examination of
Congressional Efforts to Reduce the Government’s Burden of Proof in Child Pornography Cases,
30 N. KY. L. REV. 205, 210-11 (2003).
89. 535 U.S. 234, 241-42 (2002).
90. U.S. v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 1999).
91. Id. at 65, 75.
92. Id. at 67. Section 2252A(5)(b) prohibits:
[The knowing possession of] any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer
disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been
mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer, or that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by
computer.
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(5)(b) (2000).
93. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 70.
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afforded some level of constitutional protection.94 Second, the court held that
acceptable governmental objectives regarding child pornography included
more than the protection of actual children.95 Efforts aimed at stamping out
the child pornography market, preventing the possession and viewing of
pornographic materials involving children, and ending the use of child
pornography to seduce children into the production of pornographic materials
were all held to be legitimate Congressional objectives.96 Third, the court
emphasized the importance of carefully describing “the type of condemned
sexual depiction.”97 Finally, the court held that, because these regulations
were aimed at protecting children, greater discretion and leeway ought to be
given to state legislatures and Congress “to set out the parameters of antipornography restrictions.”98
The Hilton court focused on what the proper interpretation of the “appears
to be” standard should be and, relying on the legislative record before the
passage of the Act, held that the phrase “appears to be” was synonymous with
visual depictions that were “‘virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting
viewers from unretouched photographs of actual children engaging in identical
sexual conduct.’”99
Further, the Hilton court held that the CPPA included a built-in objective
standard by which a jury would be required to make its ultimate determination
of guilt under the statute.100 “A jury must decide, based on the totality of the
circumstances, whether a reasonable unsuspecting viewer would consider the
depiction to be of an actual individual under the age of 18 engaged in sexual
activity.”101
In sum, the Hilton court refused to second-guess Congress’s findings
regarding the dangers associated with virtual child pornography and held that

94. Id. The court argued that sexually explicit material falls along “a constitutional
continuum” that entitles sexually explicit speech to “varying degrees of protection.” Id. For
example, non-obscene images of actual adults engaging in sexual activity receive full
constitutional protection while images of real children involved in sexual activity receive no
constitutional protection. Id. Images that “appear[] to depict an actual minor . . . arguably fall[]
somewhere in between.” Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The court stated that “concerns about how adults may use child pornography vis-àvis children and how children might behave after viewing it legitimately inform legislators’
collective decision to ban this material.” Id.
97. Id.
98. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 70.
99. Id. at 72 (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-358, pt. IV(B), at 15 (1996)). Unfortunately, the
Court muddled the rearticulated standard by stating that the “appears to be” language really
applies to “a specific subset of visual images—those which are easily mistaken for that of real
children.” Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 75.
101. Id.
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the government’s interest in regulating virtual child pornography was just as
compelling as the government’s interest in regulating child pornography
created using actual children.102
The next circuit to consider the constitutionality of the CPPA was the
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Acheson, which involved a defendant who
was found to have downloaded more than five hundred images of child
pornography from the Internet.103 Once again, the defendant in this case
challenged the “appears to be” language of the CPPA and maintained that the
statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, unconstitutionally vague, and in
violation of the First Amendment.104
Noting the CPPA’s minimal overbreadth,105 the Acheson court held that the
CPPA worked to eliminate child pornography and protected children from
sexual exploitation.106 The court relied on the legislative record of the CPPA
and took into account the nature of surrounding provisions of the statute to find
that the “CPPA rests on solid footing” regardless of whether or not the material
contains a depiction of an actual child or of a computer-generated image of a
child.107
To support its view that the statute was constitutionally sound, the court
pointed to the affirmative defense provided in § 2252A(c), which allowed the
defendant to assert that he or she used actual adults who were adults at the time
of the production in the sexually explicit material.108 The court was also
comforted by the burden imposed on the Government to prove that the
defendant “knowingly” possessed the child pornography.109
In the end, the court held that, despite the “legitimate sweep of the
CPPA[,] . . . the demand driving the child pornography market is primarily for
images falling far from any constitutional protection [and concluded that] the
legitimate scope of the statute dwarfs the risk of impermissible
applications.”110
In United States v. Mento,111 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard a
new variation on the constitutionality challenges advanced in Hilton and
Acheson. In Mento, the defendant was convicted of downloading from the

102. Id. at 73.
103. U.S. v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 648 (11th Cir. 1999). In this case, the defendant did not
deny that the downloaded images involved real children. Id. at 648 n.1.
104. Id. at 649.
105. Id. at 650-51 (stating that “[t]he CPPA’s overbreadth is minimal when viewed in light of
its plainly legitimate sweep”).
106. Id. at 649.
107. Id. at 651.
108. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 651.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 652.
111. 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000).
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Internet more than one hundred images of children engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.112 The defendant maintained that the real goal of the CPPA
was to eliminate certain ideas that Congress felt were particularly evil rather
than preventing harm that occurs to children as a result of their participation in
or exposure to child pornography.113
The court in Mento interpreted the Ferber decision to include within
Congress’s legitimate legislative reach the secondary effects of child
pornography and stated that “[t]he government instead aspires to shield all
children from sexual exploitation resulting from child pornography, and that
interest is indeed compelling.”114
Noting that the CPPA prohibited material that could be predominately the
product of a person’s imagination, the Court nonetheless held that virtual
depictions of child pornography had little, if any, redeeming social value and
therefore did not deserve the protections of the First Amendment.115 Further,
the Court held that the “appears to be” language implied an objective standard
by which the fact finder was to make its determination of guilt or innocence
under the statute.116 “[I]t would be the jury’s responsibility to ensure that a
reasonable person would understand the specific impression sought to be
conveyed.”117
Finally, in May 2001, in United States v. Fox, the Fifth Circuit also
addressed the constitutionality of the “appears to be” language in the CPPA.118
In Fox, the defendant was convicted of knowingly receiving child pornography
via his computer.119 The Fox court first addressed the issue of whether or not
Congress had articulated a compelling interest in regulating images that appear
to be of children engaging in sexual activity.120 Pointing to the familiar
secondary effects rationale,121 the court concluded that the Ferber and Osborne
decisions, taken together, demonstrated that the Government’s interests
extended beyond protecting only the children who engage in the production of

112. Id. at 915.
113. Id. at 919.
114. Id. at 920.
115. Id. at 921. (“[T]he Act prohibits material that is predominantly the product of the
creator’s imagination . . . . Nevertheless, artificial depictions of child pornography that cannot be
easily distinguished from the real thing do not deserve the protections of the First
Amendment . . . .”).
116. Mento, 231 F.3d at 922.
117. Id.
118. U.S. v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2001).
119. Id. at 398.
120. Id. at 400.
121. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for an explanation of the secondary effects
theory.
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the pornography.122 “It makes little difference to the children coerced by such
materials, or to the adult who employs them to lure children into sexual
activity, whether the subjects depicted are actual children or computer
simulations of children.”123 The Fox court stayed in line with the holdings of
the First, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, and held that the “appears to be”
language appropriately regulated the dangers associated with virtual child
pornography.124
Further, the Fox court emphasized the availability of the statute’s
affirmative defense for improperly charged defendants and noted the
difficulties of proving that an image contains a real child.125 In addition, the
court held that the “appears to be” language was not overbroad and would not
capture a substantial amount of otherwise-protected speech because it was
clear from the statute that “Congress intended the ‘appears to be’ language of
the statute to target only those images that are ‘virtually indistinguishable to
unsuspecting viewers from unretouched photographs of actual children.’”126
Ultimately, the Fox court was unconcerned about those images that fell on the
fringes of the statute and held that the answer was not “invalidating the statute
but rather [engaging in] ‘case-by-case analysis of the fact situations.’”127
B.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision

Sandwiched between the Eleventh Circuit’s Acheson opinion and the
Fourth Circuit’s Mento decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
sharply diverged from the views of its fellow circuits in Free Speech Coalition
v. Reno and held that the contested provisions of the CPPA were
unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and not in line with established First
Amendment jurisprudence.128 The categories of speech at issue in the case
were the same as those addressed in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh
122. Fox, 248 F.3d at 401. (“We respectfully disagree . . . that preventing harm to children
actually depicted in pornography is the only legitimate justification for Congress’s criminalizing
the possession of child pornography.”).
123. Id. at 402.
124. Id. at 407.
125. Id. at 403.
126. Id. at 405 (quoting U.S. v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting S. REP. NO.
104-358, at 7 (1996))) (emphasis added by Fox court).
127. Fox, 248 F.3d at 406 (second set of internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973)). The court created its own example of art that might
fall on the margin of the statute by referring to photorealism, an artistic method that involves a
painted replication of a printed photograph. Id.
128. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit
was the only circuit to hold that the CPPA was unconstitutional. See Fox, 248 F.3d 394; United
States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11th Cir.
1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999). See supra Part IV.A for a discussion
of these cases.
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Circuit opinions—the “appears to be” language of § 2256(8)(B)129 and the
“conveys the impression that” language of § 2256(8)(D).130
The court acknowledged the compelling interests of curbing child
pornography using real children, but refused to hold that Ferber extended
beyond the protection of real children.131 As a result, the court summarily
rejected Congress’s secondary effects rationale and held that “Congress has no
compelling interest in regulating sexually explicit materials that do not contain
visual images of actual children.”132
In two telling footnotes, the court defended its position by stating that “the
critical fault in the secondary effects analysis . . . [is that it] shifts the argument
focus from whether the questioned speech or images are constitutionally
protected to a focus on how the speech or image affects those who hear it or
see it.”133 The court further explained its position as follows: “Many innocent
things can entice children into immoral or offensive behavior, but that reality
does not create a constitutional power in the Congress to regulate otherwise
innocent behavior.”134
In addition, the court relied on American Booksellers Association v.
Hudnut as supporting precedent for its decision.135 At issue in Hudnut was a
city ordinance that prohibited pornography that portrayed women as
subordinates or showed women in submissive and degrading ways.136 The
Hudnut court invalidated the ordinance and held that while “[d]epictions of
subordination tend to perpetuate subordination . . . [i]f the fact that speech
plays a role in a process of [mind] conditioning were enough to permit
governmental regulation, that would be the end of freedom of speech.”137
Obviously concerned about criminalizing images created entirely by the
imagination, the Reno court concluded that “[b]ecause the 1996 Act attempts
to criminalize disavowed impulses of the mind, manifested in illicit creative
acts[,] . . . censorship through the enactment of criminal laws intended to
control an evil idea cannot satisfy the constitutional requirements of the First
Amendment.”138

129. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000).
130. Id. § 2256(8)(D), repealed by PROTECT Act 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502(a)(3), 117
Stat. 650, 678.
131. Reno, 198 F.3d at 1092 (“Nothing in Ferber can be said to justify the regulation of such
materials other than the protection of the actual children used in the production of child
pornography.”).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1092 n.6.
134. Id. at 1094 n.7.
135. Id. at 1093 (citing Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985)).
136. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 328.
137. Id. at 329-30.
138. Reno, 198 F.3d at 1094.
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Ultimately, the Court held that the phrases “appear to be” and “conveys the
impression that” were unconstitutionally vague because they provided no clear
standard by which to determine if something “appears to be” or “conveys the
impression” of a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct.139
C. The Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition Decision
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Free Speech Coalition v. Reno decision
to determine the constitutionality of the CPPA.140
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion for the Supreme Court and held
that: (1) “[T]he CPPA prohibits speech . . . [that may have] serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value;”141 (2) “the CPPA prohibits speech that
records no crime and creates no victims by its production;”142 (3) the
affirmative defense provided in the CPPA is “incomplete and insufficient,”143
and (4) § 2256(8)(D) is overbroad because the provision does not consider the
content of the material being pandered and therefore “the CPPA does more
than prohibit pandering. It prohibits possession of material described, or
pandered, as child pornography by someone earlier in the distribution
chain.”144
1.

CPPA Prohibits Speech that May Have Serious Value

At the core of the Supreme Court’s concern with the CPPA was its effect
of chilling speech that may have “serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.”145 The Court focused on the valuable role that literary
themes such as teenage sexuality and the sexual abuse of children have played
in our society for ages.146 In fact, the Court warned that:
Art and literature express the vital interest we all have in the formative
years . . . . If these films . . . explore those subjects [or] contain a single graphic
depiction of sexual activity within the statutory definition, the possessor of the
film would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work’s

139. Id. at 1095 (“The phrases provide no measure to guide an ordinarily intelligent person
about prohibited conduct and any such person could not be reasonably certain about whose
perspective defines the appearance of a minor, or whose impression that a minor is involved leads
to criminal prosecution.”).
140. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002) (“The principal question to
be resolved, then, is whether the CPPA is constitutional where it proscribes a significant universe
of speech that it neither obscene under Miller nor child pornography under Ferber.”).
141. Id. at 246.
142. Id. at 250.
143. Id. at 256.
144. Id. at 258.
145. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 246.
146. Id. at 247-48.
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redeeming value. This is inconsistent with an essential First Amendment rule:
The artistic merit of a work does not depend on the presence of a single
explicit scene.147

To further demonstrate its concern with the limitations imposed by the
CPPA, the Court mentioned such movies as “Traffic” and “American Beauty,”
and speculated that these films would probably be in violation of the CPPA
because they contain images that arguably “appear to be” minors engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.148
2.

The CPPA Prohibits Speech that Records No Crime and Creates No
Victims

In Free Speech Coalition, the Government argued that Congress could
legitimately regulate virtual child pornography because child pornographers
and child molesters might use the images to seduce future victims,149 that
virtual child pornography “whets the appetites of pedophiles and encourages
them to engage in illegal conduct,”150 and the Government has an interest in
curbing virtual child pornography because it has become a near-substitute for
real child pornography and thereby fuels the child pornography market.151
The Court rejected the Government’s secondary effects and market
proliferation arguments and held that the causal link between virtual child
pornography and subsequent instances of child abuse was “contingent and
indirect” and “depend[ed] on some unquantified potential for subsequent
criminal acts.”152 This holding is anchored in the Court’s critical finding that
Ferber’s focus was to prohibit child pornography made using actual children
in its production.153 Further, regarding the argument that virtual child
pornography “whets the appetites” of child abusers to engage in criminal
activity, the Court held that “[t]he mere tendency of speech to encourage
unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it.”154
The Court also held that Ferber did not hold that all child pornography is
inherently without value.155 In fact, the Court held that Ferber explicitly relied

147. Id. at 248.
148. Id. at 247-48.
149. Id. at 251.
150. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253.
151. Id. at 254.
152. Id. at 250.
153. Id. at 250-51 (“Ferber’s judgment about child pornography was based upon how it was
made, not on what it communicated. The case reaffirmed that where the speech is neither
obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the First
Amendment.”).
154. Id. at 253.
155. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 251.
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on the distinction between pornographic images produced using real children
and those that did not to support its holding.156
In response to the Government’s argument that virtual child pornography
had become a near-substitute in the “real” child pornography market, the Court
flatly disagreed and held that if the Government’s contention were true, then
potentially “legal” virtual images would have taken over the market long ago
and would have driven out the illegal images of real children.157 Any sensible
child pornographer, the Court hypothesized, would have forgone the risk of
creating illegal images using real children and simply created computergenerated images.158
3.

The Affirmative Defense is Incomplete and Insufficient

The Government argued that prosecuting child pornographers who use real
children in their material had become increasingly difficult because of the
possibility that an image might have been computer-generated.159 The
Government warned that even experts might not be able to discern whether or
not a real child has been used in an image.160 Therefore, the Government
reasoned that the best solution to this prosecutorial problem was to prevent
both virtual and real images of child pornography and provide defendants with
an affirmative defense that allowed them to show that the material was created
using only adults.161 The Court disagreed with the Government’s solution and
held that “[p]rotected speech does not become unprotected merely because it
resembles [unprotected speech].”162
The Court held that the CPPA’s affirmative defense was “incomplete and
insufficient”163 for two reasons. First, the affirmative defense did not apply
when the defendant faced a possession charge,164 and second, the affirmative
defense did not provide protection to defendants who “us[ed] computer
imaging, or through other means that [did] not involve the use of adult actors
who appear to be minors.”165
While the Court confirmed that the particular affirmative defense in the
CPPA was incomplete and insufficient, the Court left open the possibility that

156. Id. (“‘[I]f it were necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over the statutory age
who perhaps looked younger could be utilized.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763
(1982)).
157. Id. at 254.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 254.
161. Id. at 254-55.
162. Id. at 255.
163. Id. at 256.
164. Id.
165. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256.
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the CPPA could have been saved by a more complete and sufficient
affirmative defense.166
4.

Section 2256(8)(D) is Overbroad

The Court’s primary concern with the pandering provision of the CPPA
was that it did not require an inquiry into the actual content of the image that
the defendant was accused of pandering; rather, a person violated § 2256(8)(D)
merely by conveying the impression that a particular image was of a child
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.167 At bottom, the Court held that the
First Amendment required a “more precise” restriction than that which was
provided in § 2256(8)(D).168 Further, the Court stated that § 2256(8)(D)
“prohibit[ed] possession of material described, or pandered, as child
pornography by someone earlier in the distribution chain.”169
D. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in the Court’s holding reflects his concern
that at some point in the near future, technology might exist to make it
difficult, if not impossible, to prove that child pornography was created using a
real child.170 Justice Thomas was therefore concerned that the enforcement of
existing child pornography laws might become practically impossible.171 He
suggested that:
The Government may well have a compelling interest in barring or otherwise
regulating some narrow category of ‘lawful speech’ in order to enforce
effectively laws against pornography made through the abuse of real
children . . . . [A] more complete affirmative defense could save a statute’s
constitutionality . . . [and thus] some regulation of virtual child pornography
might be constitutional.172

Justice O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part with the holding.
She found that the “appears to be” language covered two types of images: (1)
those that appear to be children because they are created using youthfullooking adults, and (2) those that appear to be children because they are
created using a computer.173 With this dichotomy in place, Justice O’Connor
agreed that the statute’s ban on pornography created using youthful-looking
166. Id. (“Even if an affirmative defense can save a statute from First Amendment challenge,
here the defense is incomplete and insufficient, even on its own terms.”).
167. Id. at 257 (“The determination turns on how the speech is presented, not on what is
depicted.”).
168. Id. at 258.
169. Id.
170. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 259.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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adults was unconstitutionally overbroad.174 However, she, along with Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, did not agree with the majority that the
statute’s ban on child pornography created using a computer (virtual child
pornography) was overbroad.175
Citing the overwhelming governmental interest in halting the activities of
sexual offenders, the three Justices were persuaded by the Government’s
arguments that virtual child pornography is used to “whet the appetites of child
molesters” and to seduce children into engaging in sexually explicit conduct.176
These Justices were also troubled that a child pornographer who uses real
children to create sexually explicit images might successfully avoid
prosecution by asserting a false but unverifiable claim that the images were
computer-generated when they, in fact, were not.177
These Justices also found that the language “appears to be”—as applied to
virtual child pornography by Justice O’Connor and as applied across the board
by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia—was best interpreted as meaning “‘virtually
indistinguishable from’ . . . . [because] the narrowing interpretation avoids
constitutional problems such as overbreadth and lack of narrow tailoring.”178
Central to this argument was the Justices’ assessment that the possible conflicts
involved in deciding from whose perspective “virtually indistinguishable
from” should be based would be minimal.179 Justice O’Connor stated, “This
Court has never required ‘mathematical certainty’ or ‘meticulous specificity’
from the language of a statute.”180
In a separate dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
noted that they would have upheld the statute in its entirety and said that a fair
reading of the statute shows that its language does not unnecessarily prohibit
the youthful-looking adult pornography that Justice O’Connor would have
protected.181 The dissenting Justices were unconvinced by the Free Speech
Coalition’s doomsday view of the CPPA’s effect on free speech: “[W]e should
be loath to construe a statute as banning film portrayals of Shakespearian
tragedies . . . . [T]he CPPA has been on the books, and has been enforced,

174. Id. at 262 (“The Court correctly concludes that the causal connection between
pornographic images that ‘appear’ to include minors and actual child abuse is not strong enough
to justify withdrawing First Amendment protection for such speech.”).
175. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 260, 265.
176. Id. at 263.
177. Id. at 263.
178. Id. at 264-65.
179. Id. at 265.
180. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).
181. Id. at 269, 273.
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since 1996. The chill felt by the Court has apparently never been felt by those
who actually make movies.”182
Regarding the “conveys the impression” language found in § 2256(8)(D),
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia maintained that a fair reading of the
CPPA would reveal that § 2256(8)(D) only reaches the “‘sordid business of
pandering.’”183
V. CONGRESS’ RESPONSE: THE PROTECT ACT 2003
On April 30, 2002, the House introduced the Child Obscenity and
Pornography Prevention Act of 2002 (COPPA 2002) in response to the Free
Speech Coalition decision and later passed the COPPA 2002 on June 25,
2002.184 A companion bill, Senate Bill 2511, was introduced in the Senate on
May 14, 2002.185
Fearing the COPPA 2002 might “be more concerned with making a public
point than with making successful cases,”186 on May 15, 2002, the Senate
introduced the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2002 (PROTECT Act 2002) and later passed this
version of the PROTECT Act on November 14, 2002.187
However earnest its efforts might have been at responding to the Free
Speech Coalition decision, the 107th Congress faced the reality of a November
election and the resulting “lame duck” session of an outgoing Congress.188
Because the COPPA 2002 and the PROTECT Act 2002 were not identical,
neither bill could be approved before Congress adjourned.189 As such, “[t]hese
bills died with the demise of the 107th Congress.”190

182. Id. at 270-71 (citation omitted). To bolster this point, the Justices noted that the films
“Traffic” and “American Beauty” won their Academy Awards in 2001 and 2000, long after the
enactment of the CPPA. Id. at 271.
183. Id. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463, 467 (1966)).
184. H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2002). The COPPA 2002 was drafted by the Department of
Justice and introduced to the House by Representative Lamar Smith. 148 Cong. Rec. H3880-81
(daily ed. June 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Pomeroy).
185. S. 2511, 107th Cong. (2002).
186. Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting Our Children and the Constitution: Hearing on
S. 2520 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 145 (2002) [hereinafter Stopping
Child Pornography] (statement of Vt. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary).
187. S. 2520, 107th Cong. (2002). This 2002 version of the PROTECT Act was introduced to
the Senate by Senators Leahy and Orrin Hatch. 148 Cong. Rec. S11199 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Leahy).
188. S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. II, at 2 (2003).
189. Id. at 3.
190. Joseph J. Beard, Virtual Kiddie Porn: A Real Crime? An Analysis of the PROTECT Act,
21 ENT. & SPORTS L. 3, 4 (2003).
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Almost immediately after convening, the 108th Congress began an effort
to craft responsive legislation to the Free Speech Coalition decision. On
January 13, 2003, the Senate introduced the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools
Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act
2003),191 and on March 6, 2003, the House introduced the Child Obscenity and
Pornography Prevention Act of 2003 (COPPA 2003).192 The COPPA 2003’s
articulated purpose was to “prevent trafficking in child pornography and
obscenity, to proscribe pandering and solicitation relating to visual depictions
of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, [and] to prevent the use of
child pornography and obscenity to facilitate crimes against children.”193
Alternatively, the PROTECT Act 2003’s stated purpose is “to restore the
government’s ability to prosecute child pornography offenses successfully.”194
It should be noted that there was significant debate about key provisions in
the COPPA 2003 and the PROTECT Act 2003. To illustrate, after the House
reviewed the Senate’s version, it offered an “amendment” to the Senate bill on
March 27, 2003, which, in reality, was a recommendation that the Senate’s
language be replaced in its entirety with the House’s version found in the
COPPA 2003.195
Despite ongoing disagreement, and presumably in the interest of the
prompt passage of meaningful legislation, both houses compromised and
passed the PROTECT Act 2003 on April 10, 2003.196 President George W.
Bush signed the PROTECT Act 2003 on April 30, 2003, and stated that “[t]his
important legislation gives law enforcement authorities valuable new tools to
deter, detect, investigate, prosecute, and punish crimes against America’s
children.”197
But does it? While it is hard to imagine anyone opposing Congress’s good
intentions, the question regarding whether the PROTECT Act 2003 is
meaningful and constitutionally viable remains. In other words, what has
Congress done differently this time to ensure that America’s children will not
suffer another successful constitutional challenge to well-meaning but
ineffective legislation?

191. S. 151, 108th Cong. (2003).
192. H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003).
193. Id. at pmbl.
194. S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. I, at 1 (2003).
195. Compare House Amendment to S. 151, Title V, §§ 501-512 (March 27, 2003) with H.R.
1161, 108 Cong. at §§ 1-14 (2003) (identical language). See also Beard, supra note 190, at 4.
196. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, title V, at 59 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683,
694.
197. Statement on Signing the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 39 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 504 (April 30, 2003),
reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 705, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/s043003bh.htm.
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From the time immediately following Free Speech Coalition until the
present, both the House and Senate have made clear that their desire is to
respond to, not rehash, the problems identified by the Court in the Free Speech
Coalition decision with regard to virtual child pornography regulation. In fact,
Senator Leahy made the following statement regarding the objectives for the
PROTECT Act 2002: “The harder task is finding those kinds of legislative
solutions that are not merely designed to be tough on child pornography in the
short term, but can withstand the test of time and the scrutiny of the courts. . . .
[T]he PROTECT Act . . . is a response to the [Free Speech Coalition] decision,
not a challenge to it.”198 Supporters of the Protect Act 2003 argued that “[t]he
last thing we want to do is to create years of legal limbo for our nation’s
children . . . . Our children deserve more than a press conference on this issue.
They deserve a law that will last rather than be stricken from the law books.”199
While it remains to be seen how courts will handle future constitutional
challenges to the PROTECT Act 2003, what follows is a look at this purported
“response to the [Free Speech Coalition] decision.”200 This section presents an
overview of Congress’s findings that accompanied the PROTECT Act 2003
and highlights key provisions,201 including how the Act: (1) changes the
definition of virtual child pornography; (2) changes the offense of pandering
and solicitation of virtual child pornography, and (3) changes the affirmative
defense. Finally, this section will briefly analyze the PROTECT Act 2003’s
constitutional viability in light of the Court’s decision in Free Speech
Coalition.
A.

Congressional Findings Accompanying the PROTECT Act 2003

As expected, the PROTECT Act 2003 cites a rapidly growing need to
protect children from child molesters and child pornographers.202 It states that
“technology already exists to disguise depictions of real children to make them
unidentifiable and to make depictions of real children appear computergenerated. The technology will soon exist, if it does not already, to computer
[-]generate realistic images of children.”203

198. Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 186, at 1-2 (statement of Vt. Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
199. S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. VIII, at 16 (2003).
200. Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 186, at 2.
201. The PROTECT Act 2003 also adds two new crimes to the prosecutor’s toolbox in the
fight against the exploitation of children. See PROTECT Act 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §
503(1)(D), 117 Stat. 650, 680; id. § 504, 117 Stat. at 681-82. This Note will not analyze these
sections.
202. Id. § 501(2), 117 Stat. at 676.
203. Id. § 501(5).
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Notably, the PROTECT Act 2003 abandons the secondary effects and
market proliferation rationales204 that accompanied the CPPA and instead
emphasizes the perceived need to strengthen the Government’s ability to
prosecute child pornography offenders.205
Specifically, Congress warns that there is nothing to indicate that child
pornography bought, sold, and possessed in today’s child pornography market
is produced in any way other than through the use of an actual child.206
Congress insists that many criminal defendants claim that the image in
question is computer-generated, and therefore require that the Government
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the image is of a real child.207
Apparently, some prosecutors feel this to be an insurmountable burden in some
cases. In fact, “prosecutors in various parts of the country have expressed
concern about the continued viability of previously indicted cases as well as
declined potentially meritorious prosecutions.”208
For example, Congress highlights the fact that much of the child
pornographic material circulating on the Internet involves retransmitted images
that can be altered so as to make it impossible to determine if the depiction
involves a real child.209 Congress warns that:
[This technology creates] difficulties in enforcing the child pornography laws
[that] will continue to grow increasingly worse. The mere prospect that the
technology exists to create composite or computer-generated depictions that
are indistinguishable from depictions of real children will allow defendants
who possess images of real children to escape prosecution; for it threatens to

204. Although the secondary effects and market proliferation justifications are not explicitly
identified by the PROTECT Act 2003, one provision of the PROTECT Act 2003 is squarely
aimed at criminalizing the use of visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit
conduct to seduce children into engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Id. § 503(1)(D).
Interestingly, this provision prohibits the use of such images to persuade minors to engage in any
illegal purpose. Id. For this reason, some speculate that this provision might be overbroad. See
Beard, supra note 190, at 6.
205. PROTECT Act 2003 § 501(9); see also Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 186, at
62 (statement of Mr. Ernest E. Allen, Director, The National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children) (“[G]raphics software packages and computer animation are being used to manipulate
or ‘morph’ images and to create ‘virtual’ images indistinguishable from photographic depictions
of actual human beings. . . . [This] severely impairs the ability of law enforcement and
prosecutors to protect children by enforcing existing laws prohibiting such crimes.”).
206. PROTECT Act 2003 § 501(7).
207. Id. § 501(7), (9).
208. Id. § 501(9). But see Feldmeier, supra note 88, at 220. Noting that the prosecutor’s
perceived struggle might be exaggerated, Feldmeier states that, “of the 2091 child pornography
cases initiated by the government between 1992 and 2000, only 10 defendants, regardless of the
defense strategy they employed, were acquitted. . . . Even more telling is that none of these
acquittals are reported as being based on the so-called ‘virtual child’ defense.” Id.
209. PROTECT Act 2003 § 501(8).
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create a reasonable doubt in every case of computer images even when a real
child was abused.210

In a hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Associate Deputy Attorney General Daniel
P. Collins testified that many experts are willing to testify to the uncertainty of
whether an image was created using an actual child on behalf of defendants.211
He forecasts that, without a change in the law, “[t]rials will increasingly
devolve into jury-confusing battles of experts arguing over the method of
generating an image that, to all appearances, looks like it is the real thing.”212
What follows are key provisions from Congress’s effort to combat these
perceived obstacles and to protect the nation’s children from sexual
exploitation.
B.

How the Act Changes the Definition of Virtual Child Pornography

The PROTECT Act 2003 heeds the Court’s warning in Free Speech
Coalition regarding the unconstitutionality of the CPPA’s “appears to be”
language found at § 2256(8)(B),213 and amends this section to read:
“[C]hild pornography” means any visual depiction, including any photograph,
film, video, picture, or computer, or computer-generated image or picture,
whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of
sexually explicit conduct, where . . .
(B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computergenerated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct . . . .”214

In addition, the PROTECT Act 2003 creates a special definition for
“sexually explicit conduct” applicable to the newly amended § 2256(8)(B) by
dividing § 2256(2) into subsection (A), which includes the previous definition
of sexually explicit conduct,215 and subsection (B), which houses the following
definition applicable only to § 2256(8)(B):
“[S]exually explicit conduct” means—
(i) graphic sexual intercourse . . . whether between persons of the same or
opposite sex, or lascivious simulated sexual intercourse where the genitals,
breast, or pubic area of any person is exhibited;

210. Id. § 501(13).
211. Hearing on H.R. 4623, supra note 21, at 4 (statement of Daniel P. Collins, Associate
Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice).
212. Id.
213. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002).
214. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. I 2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B))
(emphasis added).
215. See PROTECT Act 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502(b), 117 Stat. 650, 676; 18 U.S.C. §
2256(2) (2000).
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(ii) graphic or lascivious simulated;
(I) bestiality;
(II) masturbation; or
(III) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
(iii) graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area
of any person[.]216

The PROTECT Act 2003 adds to § 2256 to define “graphic” (as used in the
new § 2256(2)(B)) and “indistinguishable” (as used in the amended §
2256(8)(B)) as follows:
(10) “[G]raphic,” when used with respect to a depiction of sexually explicit
conduct, means that a viewer can observe any part of the genitals or pubic area
of any depicted person or animal during any part of the time that the sexually
explicit conduct is being depicted; . . .
(11) ‘“[I]ndistinguishable” . . . means virtually indistinguishable, in that the
depiction is such that an ordinary person viewing the depiction would conclude
that the depiction is of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
This definition does not apply to depictions that are drawings, cartoons,
sculptures, or paintings depicting minors or adults.217

First, regarding the changes to § 2256(8)(B), it would seem at first glance
that the PROTECT Act 2003 follows the Court’s criticisms of the “appears to
be” language in Free Speech Coalition. Most notably, the definition now
limits the images that fall within its purview to “digital image[s], computer
image[s], or computer-generated image[s].”218 Further, the sexually explicit
conduct depicted must be either graphic or lascivious,219 and the depiction
must be “virtually indistinguishable” from an actual minor engaging in graphic
or lascivious actual or simulated sexual conduct.220
However, recall that the Court specifically stated that Ferber “reaffirmed
that where the [child pornography] is neither obscene nor the product of sexual
abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.”221
Further, the Court stated, “Ferber did not hold that child pornography is by

216. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(2)(B) (Supp. I 2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(B))
(emphasis added). In addition, “lascivious” is defined as “tending to excite lust; lewd; indecent;
obscene.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (5th ed. 1979).
217. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(10)-(11) (Supp. I 2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(10)(11)).
218. Id. § 2256(8)(B).
219. Id. § 2256(B)(i).
220. Id. § 2256(11).
221. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 251 (2002).
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definition without value.”222 While the PROTECT Act 2003 unquestionably
narrows the definition of virtual child pornography, it is unclear whether these
amendments sufficiently foreclose constitutional challenge.223
To be sure, the Free Speech Coalition Court rejected the “virtually
indistinguishable” rationale.224 As Professor Schauer noted in a statement
about the PROTECT Act 2002 to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “no
degree of indistinguishability in he [sic] image can create a real child where
none existed before.”225 While § 2256(8)(B) explicitly protects drawings,
cartoons, sculptures, and paintings,226 this provision might still prohibit speech
that “records no crime and creates no victims by its production.”227 By
allowing no consideration of whether the work contains serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value, the PROTECT Act 2003 could penalize
the makers or possessors of films such as “Romeo and Juliet,” “American
Beauty,” and “Traffic,”228 which all portray minors engaged in arguably
sexually explicit conduct under the new § 2256(2)(B) definition of sexually
explicit conduct.229
While this provision of the PROTECT Act 2003 would capture what most
communities would regard as objectionable virtual child pornography, it seems
that an obscenity requirement would more safely narrow § 2256(8)(B).230 In

222. Id. The Court was worried about the CPPA’s application to “a picture in a psychology
manual, as well as a movie depicting the horrors of sexual abuse. . . . Pictures of what appear to
be 17-year-olds engaging in sexually explicit activity do not in every case contravene community
standards.” Id. at 246.
223. Beard, supra note 190, at 5.
224. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 249-50; Stopping Child Pornography, supra note
186, at 117 (statement of Professor Anne M. Coughlin, University of Virginia School of Law)
(“Justice Kennedy noticed that the government sought to remedy [the “appears to be” language]
in the CPPA by arguing that the prohibited speech was ‘virtually indistinguishable’ from the child
porn that the government is free to regulate, and he disapproved this proposed understanding of
the statute.”).
225. Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 186, at 154 (statement of Professor Frederick
Schauer, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University).
226. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(11) (Supp. I 2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(11)).
227. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250.
228. Recall that the Court expressed that these films might have fallen “within the wide
sweep of the [CPPA’s] prohibitions.” Id. at 248.
229. Congress attempts to minimize this concern by stating that “[l]imiting the definition to
digital, computer, or computer-generated images will help to exclude ordinary motion pictures
from the coverage of ‘virtual child pornography.’” H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, title V, at 60 (2003),
reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 695 (emphasis added). Note, however, that many movies
are viewed on DVD, and the term DVD stands for digital video disc. In any event, it is difficult
to understand why the medium used, whether it be digital, computer, film, or something else,
would ultimately determine whether a work is protected by the First Amendment.
230. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Miller obscenity
standard.
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fact, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children advocates this
view:
[T]he vast majority (99-100%) of all child pornography would be found to be
obscene by most judges and juries . . . [I]t is highly unlikely that any
community would not find child pornography obscene.
...
In the post-Free Speech decision legal climate the prosecution of child
pornography cases under an obscenity approach is a reasonable strategy and
sound policy.231

It appears that Senators Leahy, Biden, and Feingold would agree with this
approach as well: “The Supreme Court made it clear that we can only outlaw
child pornography in two situations: one where it is obscene, or two, where it
involves real kids. That is the law . . . whether or not we agree with it.”232
C. How the PROTECT Act 2003 Changes the Criminalization of Pandering
and Solicitation
The PROTECT Act 2003 completely eliminates 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D),
the CPPA provision that defined child pornography as the advertisement,
promotion, presentation, description, or distribution of any visual depiction in
such a way that “conveys the impression that” the material contains a visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.233 In Free Speech
Coalition, the Court held that this provision was substantially overbroad and in
violation of the First Amendment.234
The new pandering and solicitation provision in the PROTECT Act 2003
amends 18 U.S.C. § 2252A by breaking up § 2252A(3) into two subsections.
The original provision remains at § 2252A(a)(3)(A), while the PROTECT Act
2003 adds the following new pandering provision at § 2252A(a)(3)(B):
(3) [Any person who] knowingly . . .
(B) advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the
mails, or in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by
computer, any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the
belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the material or
purported material is, or contains—

231. S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. VIII, at 28 (2003).
232. Id. at 27. See also Feldmeier, supra note 88, at 220 (“[B]ecause a non-obscene image
that is ‘indistinguishable’ from that of a minor . . . does not depict an actual child, it does not fall
outside the protection of the First Amendment.”).
233. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000), repealed by PROTECT Act 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §
502(a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 678.
234. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
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(i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; or
(ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.235

In the PROTECT Act 2003’s Conference Report, Congress explains that
“this provision prohibits an individual from offering to distribute anything that
he specifically intends to cause a recipient to believe would be actual or
obscene child pornography. . . . [and] prohibits an individual from soliciting
what he believes to be actual or obscene child pornography.”236
This section is troublesome for two reasons. First, the “‘purported
material’ [language] criminalizes speech even when there is no underlying
material at all—whether obscene or non-obscene, virtual or real, child or
adult.”237 This seems to be in direct contravention of the Court’s holding in
Free Speech Coalition where it disapproved of the CPPA’s pandering
provision because, under it:
[C]ontent is irrelevant. Even if a film contains no sexually explicit scenes
involving minors, it could be treated as child pornography if the title and
trailers convey the impression that the scenes would be found in the movie.
The determination turns on how the speech is presented, not on what is
depicted.238

Recall that the Free Speech Coalition Court made it clear that visual depictions
of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct might still be legal if the
depiction has literary or other significant value.239
Second, § 2252A(a)(3)(B)(ii) potentially criminalizes the promotion of
materials that are not obscene and do not involve the use of an actual child.240
Arguably, this provision of the PROTECT Act 2003 would mean that “[a]ny
person or movie theatre that presented films like Traffic, Romeo and Juliet,
and American Beauty would be guilty of a felony. . . . The whole aim of
dramatic presentation is to convince the viewer that what is, in fact, fiction is
fact.”241

235. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. I 2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(3)(B)) (emphasis added).
236. H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, title V, at 61 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 695.
237. S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. VIII, at 23 (2003). One concern about the “purported material”
language is that the provision might “federally criminalize talking dirty over the Internet or the
telephone when the person never possesses any material at all. That is speech, and that goes too
far.” Id. at 24.
238. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 257.
239. See id. at 251; see also supra text accompanying notes 145-48 and 155-56.
240. See S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. VIII, at 24.
241. Id.
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Further, the Free Speech Coalition Court required that the Government
explain the evils posed by pandering images that simply “look like child
pornography.”242 Notably, Congress has somewhat flimsily articulated a
reason why the mere pandering of otherwise legal images should be prohibited.
In the PROTECT Act 2003’s Conference Report, Congress mentions that
“even fraudulent offers to buy or sell unprotected child pornography help to
sustain the illegal market for this material.”243 This appears to be a
resurrection of the market-deterrence theory advanced by the Government in
Free Speech Coalition.244 The Court summarized and disposed of this
argument as follows: “[I]t is said, virtual images promote the trafficking in
works produced through the exploitation of real children. The hypothesis is
somewhat implausible.”245
Once again, Congress has failed to articulate specifically how the
pandering and solicitation of legal images fuels the market for illegal images
of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Put simply, in what way
would a trailer for “Traffic,” “Romeo and Juliet,” or “American Beauty” fuel
the market for images of actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct
or obscene images of children (actual or real) engaging in sexually explicit
conduct?
Finally, it is important to note, the PROTECT Act 2003 does include an
affirmative defense;246 however, § 2252A(c) excludes from its purview §
2252A(a)(3)(B). Congress explains that the PROTECT Act 2003’s affirmative
defense is “comprehensive . . . for anyone charged with distributing or
possessing child pornography . . . [but the PROTECT Act] ensure[s] [that] the
defense does not apply to the pandering provisions.”247 As previously
explained, § 2252A(a)(3)(B)(ii) potentially criminalizes the promotion of
materials that are not obscene and do not involve the use of an actual child.248
As such, the PROTECT Act 2003’s affirmative defense can hardly be
characterized as “comprehensive.”
For these reasons, the pandering and solicitation provision of the
PROTECT Act 2003 seems especially vulnerable to constitutional
challenge.249

242. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 257.
243. H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, title V, at 62 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 696.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 152-58.
245. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 254.
246. See infra notes 251-66 and accompanying text.
247. H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, title V, at 61 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 696.
248. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.
249. S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. VIII, at 24 (2003) (“[T]he decision to obviate the need to
demonstrate any relation to obscenity places the constitutionality of the provision as a whole at
risk.”).
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D. How the PROTECT Act 2003 Changes the Affirmative Defense
The PROTECT Act 2003 provides the following amended affirmative
defense to be codified at § 2252A(c):
(c) It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating paragraph (1), (2),
(3)(A), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) that—
(1)(A) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person
or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) each such person was an adult at the time the material was produced;
or
(2) the alleged child pornography was not produced using any actual minor
or minors. . . .
A defendant may not assert an affirmative defense to a charge of violating
paragraph (1), (2), (3)(A), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) unless . . . the defendant
provides the court and the United States with notice of the intent to assert such
defense.250

In Free Speech Coalition, the Court held that the affirmative defense
provided in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A of the CPPA251 was incomplete and insufficient
and that it failed to protect a significant amount of lawful speech.252
Specifically, Justice Kennedy held that the affirmative defense provided in the
CPPA was “incomplete and insufficient”253 because the defense did not extend

250. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(c) (Supp. I 2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)).
251. This affirmative defense provided:
It shall be an affirmative defense . . . that—
(1) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person or persons
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(2) each such person was an adult at the time the material was produced; and
(3) the defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or distribute the material
in such a manner as to convey the impression that it is or contains a visual depiction
of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000).
252. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). In a discussion about the
insufficiency of the affirmative defense provided in the CPPA, the Court concluded, “Even if an
affirmative defense can save a statute from First Amendment challenge, here the defense is
incomplete and insufficient, even on its own terms.” Id.
253. Id.
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to possession offenses,254 nor did the defense protect defendants who could
prove that the images in question were not produced using actual children.255
In response to the Court’s concern that the affirmative defense failed to
protect defendants who could prove that no child was used in the production of
the material in question, the PROTECT Act 2003 now protects defendants in
two situations: (1) when the alleged child pornography was produced using an
actual person engaging in sexually explicit conduct and that person was an
adult at the time of production,256 or (2) when the alleged child pornography
was not produced using an actual minor.257
Both scenarios seem to answer the majority’s immediate concerns
regarding the ineffectiveness of the CPPA’s affirmative defense, but critics
raise an important point: the PROTECT Act 2003’s affirmative defense
arguably presupposes that a real child was used in the production of the
image.258 Is it not the government’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the image is of an actual child?
Some say the PROTECT Act 2003’s “relaxed definition of child
pornography,”259 together with its affirmative defense, unfairly requires a
defendant to “prove the government’s case.”260 Further, it is argued that the
PROTECT Act 2003’s affirmative defense “ignores the reality that most
defendants lack the resources or the ability to prove that a ‘fictional’ character
is not a real minor. If the government . . . is purportedly having trouble . . .

254. Id. at 255-56 (“Where the defendant is not the producer of the work, he may have no
way of establishing the identity, or even the existence, of the actors. If the evidentiary issue is a
serious problem for the Government, as it asserts, it will be at least as difficult for the innocent
possessor.”). The PROTECT Act 2003 explicitly extends the § 2252A(c) affirmative defense to
alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5). PROTECT Act 2003 § 502(d), 117 Stat. at 679.
255. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256. The affirmative defense “allows persons to be
convicted in some instances where they can prove children were not exploited in the production.”
Id.
256. PROTECT Act 2003 § 502(d) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(1)(A)-(B)).
257. Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(2)). See also Beard, supra note 190, at 5.
258. Feldmeier, supra note 88, at 223. As Feldmeier noted:
In essence, under Section 2252A(c)(1), all federal prosecutors must do in child
pornography cases is prove that the charged material contains an image that is
‘indistinguishable’ from that of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Once this is
done, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant who is then responsible for proving that
the image is not of an actual child.
Id.
259. Id. at 224. See also Beard, supra note 190, at 5 (“[T]here remains the Supreme Court’s
more general criticism that a criminal law that shifts the burden to the accused ‘raises serious
constitutional difficulties.’”) (quoting Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255).
260. Feldmeier, supra note 88, at 224.
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then how can criminal defendants, many of whom are indigent, be expected to
do so?”261
Others argue that the affirmative defense is fair and affords (at least for a
producer-defendant) the opportunity to prove that adults were used in the
material or that the material was made without the use of an actual minor.262
After all, many of these defendants are hardly indigent; they presumably had
the money for a fancy computer and software. In support of a provision
substantially similar to the one found in the PROTECT Act 2003, the Senate
defended the affirmative defense by stating that “this provision places the
burden of proof on the party that is in the best position to determine the
pertinent facts.”263
Finally, some support the PROTECT Act 2003’s affirmative defense on
the ground that it is unreasonable to expect some prosecutors with limited
access to sophisticated investigative tools to review every pornographic image
involving children for evidence that a real child was used.264 Indeed, some feel
that this task might be “overwhelming” for prosecutors.265
Even assuming these perceived obstacles are real, it is difficult to imagine
any scenario in which the American system of justice relieves, or even
minimizes, a prosecutor’s burden because something is “too hard.” The
credibility of our American system of criminal justice relies upon the
government marshalling sufficient evidence against a defendant so as to
eliminate reasonable doubt in the minds of judges and juries. Any other
standard “undermine[s] and insult[s] the men and women serving as federal
prosecutors who are more than capable of securing child pornography
convictions without the assistance of dumbed-down evidentiary standards.”266
VII. CONCLUSION
While it remains to be seen whether the PROTECT Act 2003 will survive
the scrutiny of the Supreme Court, it is clear that Congress has made progress
in crafting legislation that presents a more comprehensive solution to the child
pornography problem.

261. Id. at 225. Feldmeier further states that “it is patently unfair, unreasonable, and
unconstitutional to afford the government a ‘close-enough’ standard in child pornography cases,
while requiring defendants to demonstrate with precision the non-minor status of the person
depicted.” Id.
262. See S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. III, at 8 (2003).
263. Id.
264. Robin Schmidt-Sandwick, Freedom of Speech: Supreme Court Strikes Down Two
Provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA), Leaving Virtual Child
Pornography Virtually Unregulated, 79 N.D. L. REV. 175, 200 (2003) (proposing that prosecutors
face significant challenges in mounting successful cases against child pornographers).
265. Id.
266. Feldmeier, supra note 88, at 228.
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Despite the great debate that ensued while finalizing its legislative
response to the Free Speech Coalition decision, one thing is certain: Congress
is not willing to compromise in its mission to protect children from the evils of
child pornography and child molestation. Crafting legislation that both targets
specific Congressional objectives and respects the speech freedoms guaranteed
by the First Amendment will help secure the legislative protection that child
pornography and molestation victims not only deserve, but also so desperately
require.267
KATE DUGAN*
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